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Abstract 
Recent research has shown that improving women’s decisionmaking power 
relative to men’s within households leads to improvements in a variety of well-being 
outcomes for children.  In South Asia, where the influence of women’s power is 
particularly strong, these outcomes include children’s nutritional status and the quality of 
feeding and health care practices.  Focusing on nutritional status, this paper presents the 
results of a study investigating whether increases in women’s power have a stronger 
positive influence on the nutritional status of their daughters than their sons.  If so, then 
increasing women’s power not only improves the well-being of children as a group, but 
also serves as a force to reduce long-standing discrimination that undermines female 
capabilities in many important areas of life as well as human and economic development 
in general.  To investigate this issue, the study draws on Demographic and Health Survey 
data collected during the 1990s in four countries:  Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and 
Pakistan.  The main empirical technique employed is multivariate regression analysis 
with statistical tests for significant differences in effects for girl and boy children.  A total 
of 30,334 women and 33,316 children under three years old are included in the analysis.  
The study concludes that, for the South Asia region as a whole, an increase in women’s 
decisionmaking power relative to men’s, if substantial, would be an effective force for 
reducing discrimination against girl children.  However, this finding is not applicable in 
all countries and for all areas and age groups of children.  Indeed the study finds evidence 
that in some areas, for instance the northern and western states of India as a group, 
increasing women’s power would lead to a worsening of gender discrimination against 
girls.  This is likely the result of deeply embedded son preference associated with highly 
patriarchal social systems.  The lesson for policymakers and development practitioners is 
that while increasing women’s power is likely to improve the well-being of children, in 
some geographical areas it will not necessarily diminish discrimination against girls, 
which violates human rights and undermines the region’s economic development and the 
health of its population.  In these areas, to overcome son preference, economic returns to 
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girls will have to be increased and efforts to change customs regarding marriage and 
inheritance associated with patriarchal kinship systems, which favor males, will have to 
be made. 
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1.  Introduction 
South Asia is the region with the most severe anti-female gender discrimination in 
the world.  Among adults, it is manifested in strong gender differences in education 
levels, employment, and earnings (World Bank 2001).  The region’s high rates of 
maternal mortality (Adamson 1996) indicate a neglect of women’s health care.  While not 
all studies agree, many find that males are favored in the allocation of food within 
households, especially when it comes to diet quality (Haddad et al. 1996; Chen, Huq, and 
D’Souza 1981; Bouis and Novenario-Reese 1997; Del Ninno et al. 2001; DeRose, 
Messer, and Millman 1998; Miller 1992).   
Gender-based discrimination in the region is not limited to adults.  Among 
children, boys are treated for illness more often than girls, and immunization rates are 
higher for boys, indicating a relative neglect of girls’ health needs (Haddad et al. 1996; 
Filmer, King, and Pritchett 1998; Arnold 1997; Ryland and Raggers 1998; Hazarika 
2000).  The most extreme son preference in the world is found in South Asian countries.  
It stems from economic considerations such as the greater ability of sons to provide old-
age economic support to parents, and from deeply engrained traditions, such as dowry, 
which make it costly to marry off daughters (Arnold 1997; Alderman and Gertler 1997; 
Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982).  Perhaps the most disturbing manifestations of son 
preference are female infanticide (relatively rare) and an increasingly common “high-
tech” form of discrimination, sex-selective abortion, leading to “natality inequality” 
between the genders (Sen 2001; Miller 2001).  With these practices, girl children’s rights 
are violated before they are even born or shortly after, times when they are most 
vulnerable and innocent. 
The end result of gender discrimination among both adults and children in South 
Asia is a high rate of excess female mortality, unnaturally low life expectancies for 
females relative to males, and population sex ratios skewed disproportionately in favor of 
males.  At an aggregate level, these skewed ratios document that millions of women are 
missing from the region’s population (Sen 1992; Klasen and Wink 2001).   
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Poor health among girls and women leads to low birth weight in babies and 
continued health problems for both men and women, including increased incidence of 
cardiovascular disease later in life.  Further, gender inequalities slow the pace of 
development by stalling economic growth and poverty reduction (Sen 2001; World Bank 
2001).  Reducing gender discrimination would not only improve equity, it would benefit 
the regions’ overall social and economic development in many ways. 
While women’s decisionmaking power within households, where most of the 
decisions about care for children take place, is known to be lower than that of their 
husbands, women are the main caretakers of children in South Asia, as in most of the 
developing world.  Past studies have demonstrated that when their power is increased, 
women use it to direct household resources toward improving their caring practices and, 
therefore, the health and nutritional status of their children (see, for example, Smith et al. 
2003; Thomas 1997; Doss 1997; Kishor 2000; Mencher 1988). 
This study asks if there is an association between women’s power and 
discrimination against girl children in South Asia.  The results will help assess whether 
women would use increased power to direct household resources toward equalizing the 
well-being of girls and boys.  The measure used for examining gender discrimination 
among children is comparison of the nutritional status of girls and boys 0 to 3 years old.  
Nutritional status is the outcome of a child’s nutrient intakes and health status, both of 
which are strongly influenced by the quality of the care children receive (UNICEF 
1998).1  The objective of the paper is to determine whether increases in women’s 
decisionmaking power relative to their husbands will lead to greater improvements in girl 
children’s nutritional well-being than boy children’s, evidence that increasing women’s 
power would serve to reduce gender inequalities not only among adults but in the next 
generation as well.  The data employed are from nationally representative Demographic 
and Health Surveys conducted in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. 
                                                 
1 “Care” is defined as “the provision in household and communities of time, attention, and support to meet 
the physical, mental, and social needs of the growing child and other household members” (ICN 1992).  
Examples of caring practices include breastfeeding, complementary feeding, and the utilization of health 
services and facilities to attend to health needs targeted programs.” 
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The next section reviews previous studies of the effects of parental power on 
investment in female and male children.  Then the data sets, measures of child nutritional 
status and women’s power, and methods employed are discussed.  Finally the empirical 
results are presented and discussed, followed by concluding comments. 
2.  Parental Power and Gender Discrimination among Children 
Power is the ability to make choices.  It is the ability of a person or group of 
people to define goals and pursue them, even in the face of opposition from others.  It is 
exercised through decisionmaking and can take the form of actual decisions made on 
one’s own or made jointly with another person through a process of bargaining and 
negotiation.  It can also take the form of deception and manipulation, subversion and 
resistance, violence, coercion, threat, or even “non-decisionmaking,” in which a person or 
group accepts the status quo as given without reflection or allows others to make a 
decision for them (Kabeer 1999; Riley 1997; Safilios-Rothschild 1982; Sen 1990).  A 
person’s control over resources, including economic resources, human resources (such as 
education), and social resources (such as membership in groups), enhances her or his 
ability to exercise choice (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; Kabeer 1999; Sen and 
Batliwala 2000).   
The question this study explores is whether increasing the power of women 
relative to men within households will bring about a reduction in discrimination against 
girl children in South Asia.  There are at least three circumstances under which such a 
reduction might be expected.  First, if women’s basic preferences are inherently altruistic 
toward all, regardless of gender, we would expect them to strive to provide equitable care 
to boys and girls, given the ability to do so.  Second, such a reduction might be expected 
if exposure to education, employment, and time spent outside of the home, which are 
common instigators of power shifts, bring increased consciousness on the part of women 
of gender inequalities and a subsequent growing sense of responsibility for reducing them 
among their own children.  Finally, it might be expected if women and men have same-
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sex preferences, in which case women would actually favor their own gender and thus 
tend to allocate increased resources under their control toward girls. 
While some may think it inevitable that women will take action to reduce gender 
discrimination against girls as their power increases, for whichever of the above reasons, 
Sen (2001) questions this assumption.  Pointing to the number of Indian women who 
choose to use sex-selective abortion, he writes “This face of gender inequality cannot . . . 
be removed, at least in the short run, by the enhancement of women’s empowerment and 
agency, since that agency is itself an integral part of the cause of natality inequality” (Sen 
2001, p. 11).  He points to the examples of East Asian countries, such as Singapore, 
Taiwan, China, and South Korea, where two traditional paths to reducing gender 
inequality, increased female education and economic participation, do not appear to have 
reduced natality and mortality inequalities that favor males.  These countries have even 
more male-skewed population ratios than those of South Asia. 
Turning to the evidence from past empirical studies, most have explored parental 
investment patterns in children and have focused on control over resources as an 
indicator of power.  Among these, few have looked specifically at differences in parental 
investment, disaggregating both between resources controlled by mothers and fathers as 
well as investments in daughters and sons.  Those that do find mixed results. 
Hallman (2000) finds that parental resource control, measured as control over 
current and premarital assets as well as transfers of assets at marriage, has different 
effects on child health in Bangladesh, depending on the gender of the parent and of the 
child.  Mothers’ resources reduce morbidity of preschool-age girls, while fathers’ 
resources reduce morbidity of preschool boys.  The study thus detects same-sex 
preferences in the effect of parental resource control, suggesting that increasing women’s 
power would indeed reduce discrimination against girls. 
Using data from four developing countries, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) test 
for differences in educational attainment of school-aged girls and boys associated with 
their mother’s and father’s education or assets controlled at the time of marriage.  They 
find a pattern of same-sex preferences in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and among households of 
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Indian origin in South Africa.  They find no evidence of gender preferences in Indonesia, 
but of opposite-sex preferences among African households in South Africa.  Among the 
latter, fathers’ education and assets are associated with better educational outcomes for 
daughters than sons while mothers’ education is associated with better outcomes for sons. 
Similarly, while some earlier studies from across the developing world, as 
reviewed by Hallman (2000), find a pattern of same-sex preferences, others do not.  
Analyzing data from urban Brazil, Thomas (1990) finds that parents’ individual non-
labor income is associated with larger positive effects on the nutritional status of children 
of their same gender, that is, mothers invest more in daughters and fathers invest more in 
sons.  Similarly, in Zambia, Wang (1996) finds that mothers’ income improves infant 
girls’ nutritional status while fathers’ income improves infant boys’.  However, a study 
by Haddad and Hoddinott (1994) concludes that increases in women’s share of household 
cash income in Côte d’Ivoire result in greater improvements in boys’ nutritional status 
than in girls’, evidence of opposite-sex preferences. 
Godoy et al. (2003) test whether parents invest resources consistently in favor of 
children of one sex, using panel data from an Amerindian group living in the Bolivian 
Amazon.  The study considers a variety of resources, including income, wealth, and 
schooling, with nutritional status as the child well-being outcome.  The conclusion 
reached is that mothers and fathers do not invest resources consistently in favor of 
children of either sex.  For example, fathers’ cash earnings are found to benefit boys 
more than girls, but fathers’ schooling and wealth benefit girls more than boys.  In the 
Philippines, Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka (2004) find that parents invest resources 
differently by gender of their children, directing greater investment in education to 
daughters and land inheritance toward sons.  The authors conclude that land and 
schooling are alternate forms of intergenerational wealth transfers and may be close 
substitutes. 
In sum, a clear global pattern of gender discrimination in investment in children 
by mothers and fathers does not emerge from existing research.  This is to be expected as 
the relative returns to parents from investing in boys and girls, for example in the form of 
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old age support, as well as the degree of patriarchy in kinship systems, differ substantially 
across cultures and societies (see discussion below).  With respect to South Asia in 
particular, while the two studies from Bangladesh, and that of households of Indian origin 
in South Africa, suggest same-sex preferences, no strong hypothesis as to the direction of 
the effect of women’s power on discrimination among girl and boy children can be 
advanced given the dearth of studies.  The rest of this paper attempts to fill this 
knowledge gap using a broad set of data covering multiple countries in the region. 
3.  Data, Measures, and Methods 
Data 
This study employs data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) conducted 
in the 1990s in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan.  These countries represent 97 
percent of the population of South Asia.  The sample includes 33,316 children under 
three years of age and 30,334 women-husband pairs, usually the children’s parents.2  The 
country with the largest sample size, by far, is India (see Table 1). 
Table 1—The data sets and sample sizes 
 Name of survey 
Year of 
collection 
Number of 
children (< 3 
years of age) 
Number of 
women/ 
husbands
Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey III 1997 2,767 2,633 
India National Family Health Survey II 1998 24,360 22,149 
Nepal Demographic and Health Survey III 1996 3,692 2,349 
Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey II 1991 2,497 2,203 
Total from all countries   33,316 30,334 
 
The DHS data sets are from nationally representative surveys of households with 
at least one woman 10 to 49 years of age.  The surveys are based on two-stage sample 
designs.  In the first stage, enumeration units or “clusters” are selected from larger 
                                                 
2 Only children living in households containing both their mother and her husband are included, as is 
necessary for construction of the measure of women’s relative decisionmaking power (see below).  The 
percent of women dropped from the sample because they did not meet these criteria is 1.2 percent.  
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regional units within countries.  Then households are randomly selected within clusters 
(Macro International, Inc. 1996).  The data are collected by various in-country research 
and statistical agencies with technical assistance from Macro International, Inc., and 
major funding from the United States Agency for International Development.  Due to 
similar survey instruments and data collection methodologies, the data are largely 
comparable across countries.  
Measure of Child Nutritional Status 
The measure of nutritional status employed is a child’s height-for-age Z-score 
(HAZ), a long-term measure of nutritional well-being reflecting linear growth achieved 
both in utero and during early childhood.  Children who have a HAZ two standard 
deviations below the median (HAZ ≤ -2) of the National Center for Health 
Statistics/World Health Organization international growth reference (WHO 1995) are 
considered to be “stunted.”  A stunted child has likely suffered from long-term 
inadequate nutrition or poor health or both. 
Measure of Women’s Relative Decisionmaking Power 
The measure of women’s decisionmaking power relative to their husbands used in 
this study is based on four indicators that are combined into an index using factor 
analysis.  The indicators were chosen as part of a broader global study investigating the 
influence of women’s status on child nutritional status in developing countries (Smith et 
al. 2003) and based on their conceptual relevance, their applicability across cultures, and 
their availability for a large number of developing countries.  The sample for creation of 
the index includes 133,555 women and their husbands from 40 countries in four 
developing regions:  South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and the Near East and North Africa. 
Indicators of women’s relative decisionmaking power can be classified into three 
types (Kishor 2000):  (1) those that give direct evidence of such power; (2) those that are 
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sources of power; and (3) those that characterize the setting of power.  All three are 
important in measuring relative decisionmaking power in households, with the first 
capturing the end product, and (2) and (3) capturing the process leading to the outcome.  
“Direct evidence” indicators come from data collected through detailed surveys of the 
nature of decisionmaking in households, including control over resources, women’s 
autonomy, and women’s and men’s attitudes on gender roles and acceptable behaviors.  
“Source” indicators of power represent the building blocks of power, which are 
knowledge and advantage in access to or control of resources.  Examples of such 
indicators are education, employment, media exposure, earnings, and asset ownership.  
“Setting” indicators refer to the circumstances women and their husbands find themselves 
in that are a constant of their environment or that they were exposed to at different times 
in their lives.  Examples of setting indicators are customs and norms regarding marriage 
(for example, dowry, levirate, co-residence with in-laws), the literacy and education of 
spouses’ parents, age differences between spouses, education differences between 
spouses, and the degree of spousal communication (Kishor 2000). 
Given the data available in the DHS surveys, this study employs source and 
setting indicators.  In keeping with the multidimensionality of the concept of women’s 
empowerment or status (Mason 1986; Jejeebhoy 2000; Sen and Batliwala 2000), four 
indicators, one in the area of employment, one in the area of marriage, and two in the area 
of human capital (education and experience) are employed.  The following is a list of the 
indicators along with a brief rationale for choosing them.  Note that indicators (1) and (2) 
are source indicators, while (3) and (4) are setting indicators.  Table 2 reports the mean of 
each indicator for the study countries. 
(1) Whether the woman works for cash income (workcash, a dummy variable). 
Contributing cash income to a household’s budget is thought to be a source of 
increased decisionmaking power of women relative to their husbands for a number of 
reasons.  First, it can give a woman a higher perceived contribution to her household’s 
economic status.  Second, employment is at the root of women’s economic independence 
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from men.  If such employment is gained other than in a family business, it increases a 
woman’s fall-back position, giving her greater bargaining power.  Her control over 
income may be enhanced either through her own earnings or a greater influence over the 
allocation of total household income, depending on her household’s decisionmaking 
mode.  These benefits are thought to be enhanced if the woman works for cash.  
Additional benefits if the woman works outside of her home are increased social contact, 
which provides a source of social capital outside of the immediate family or kinship 
group, exposure to knowledge and new norms of behavior, enhanced capability, and a 
clearer perception of individuality and well-being, all of which may enhance a woman’s 
power relative to her husband’s (Sen 1990; England 2000; Riley 1997; Kishor 1999, 
2000). 3  In the study sample, 15.4percent of women work for cash.  Note that because the 
large majority of sample men do so, this indicator essentially captures women’s cash 
earning relative to men’s. 
(2) The woman’s age at first marriage (agemar). 
Across the world women usually marry at younger ages than men, and in 
developing countries they tend to begin married life at a very young age.  The average 
age at first marriage of the women in this study is 17.1 years, with the lowest in 
Bangladesh at 14.3 years.  At its foundation, age at marriage is directly linked to 
women’s power, because early marriage is a strategy used by older generations to control 
the sexuality of unmarried females (Mason 1993). From a practical standpoint, early 
marriage is thought to perpetuate the weaker decisionmaking power of women than men 
in households.  The earlier a woman marries the less likely she is to have an opportunity 
to develop an income-earning career, to create support networks beyond her family, or to 
complete schooling.  This is partially because of the demands of childbearing, which start 
                                                 
3 There is a long-standing debate over whether women who work outside of their home in very patriarchal 
cultures, for example, those in South Asia practicing purdah, actually gain power from doing so.  Women 
may be looked down upon if they work outside of the home because it is considered a sign of poverty, since 
most only do so out of dire economic need (Mason 1986; Sathar and Kazi 1990; Safilios-Rothschild 1982). 
However, many studies have shown that even in the most patriarchal of cultures women who work 
eventually gain greater power despite initial resistance (Kishor 2000; Simmons, Mita, and Koenig 1992). 
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soon after marriage (Riley 1997; Kishor 1999).  Men’s ages at first marriage are not 
reported in the DHS surveys so it is not possible to construct a relative measure of this 
indicator. 
(3) The percent difference in the woman’s and her husband’s age (agedif). 
Power structures within the household are often based on age hierarchies.  This 
indicator is included because in households in which men are considerably older than 
their wives, wives are believed to have a disadvantage in their ability to exercise 
decisionmaking power (Balk 1997, cited in Yount 1999; Kishor 1999).  In all of the study 
countries women are generally at an age disadvantage relative to their husbands, with the 
average percent difference being around 20 percent.  The percent difference (rather than 
the difference itself) controls for the age of the woman’s husband, so that the same 
difference is given a higher value the lower the husband’s age, basically giving this factor 
more importance for younger couples. 
(4) The difference in the woman’s and her husband’s years of education (educdif). 
Education confers many benefits on its holder that are sources of power, including 
increased opportunities for employment, increased knowledge and skills that allow one to 
better understand, interpret, and operate in one’s environment (Kishor and Neitzel 1996; 
Kishor 1999), and increased social contacts outside of the home.  In South Asia, as across 
most of the developing world, women are at an educational disadvantage relative to men.  
Our indicator captures relative difference in education by taking the total number of years 
of formal schooling of the husband minus the years of schooling of the wife.  In the study 
sample, the average difference is 2.5 years. 
Factor analysis is employed to combine the above four indicators into an index.  
This “data reduction” technique reduces a set of observed variables that are hypothesized 
to be related to one another to a smaller number of unobserved, more fundamental 
constructs called “factors.” It does so by detecting structure in the relationships among 
the observed variables as represented by their correlation matrix.  For each identified 
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factor, the analysis produces “loadings,” one for each variable, that are estimated drawing 
only on the shared variance of the variables.  The loadings are the correlation between 
the observed variables and the factor.  If, after examining the loadings, the hypothesis is 
born out, then new variables (indices, or factor scores) that are linear combinations of the 
observed variables are estimated, based on the loadings.  Note that the original observed 
variables are standardized before analysis so that their ranges and variations do not affect 
their index coefficients (Sharma 1996). 
The factor analysis yields one factor for which the loadings of all four indicators 
are positive (and the eigenvalue is positive, meaning that sufficient variance is captured).  
The resulting index is calculated as follows: 
educdifagedifagemarworkcashindexdm ∗+∗+∗+∗= 1540.02832.03645.00701.0_ , 
where the values of the indicators are standardized values.  Accordingly, agemar is given 
the greatest weight, followed by agedif, educdif, and lastly workcash.  The final index is 
placed on a 0–100 scale for ease of interpretation in the regression analysis.  The sample 
mean of the index is 34 (Table 2).  It is highest for Pakistan, followed by India and Nepal, 
and lowest for Bangladesh.  Note for reference that the index value for Norway, where 
women and men have the highest degree of equality in power in the world today 
according to the above indicators, is 59.2 (Smith et al. 2003).4  
Smith et al. (2003) undertake a validation analysis using data from one of the 
study countries, India, in which the “validation variables”—which give direct evidence of 
women’s decisionmaking power relative to men5—are compared with the four indicators 
and the index.  The analysis shows that the indicators and the index are all significantly 
                                                 
4 Note also that a factor analysis index based only on the four South Asian countries of this study assigns 
roughly the same index numbers to women, having a correlation with the 40-country index of 0.97 
(p=0.000). 
5 The validation variables are dummy variables constructed from women’s answers to the following 
questions:  (1) Is  the woman allowed to “set money aside”? (2) Does the woman participate in decisions 
about her visiting her natal family? (3) Does the woman participate in decisions on obtaining health care? 
(4) Is the woman allowed to both go to the market and to visit relatives or friends? 
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and positively associated with the validation variables.  The index itself is quite strongly 
associated with them, and the indicators are ranked in strength of association as follows:  
percent difference in woman’s and her husband’s age (strongest), woman’s age at first 
marriage, whether the woman works for cash income, and the difference in the woman’s 
and her husband’s years of education (weakest).  We can thus move forward with 
confidence that the index indeed represents women’s decisionmaking power relative to 
men’s. 
Table 2—Means of indicators and index of women's decisionmaking power relative to men
 
Whether 
woman 
works for 
cash  
Woman's age 
at first 
marriage 
Age difference 
of woman and 
husband 
Education 
difference of 
woman and 
husband 
Index of women's 
relative decisionmaking 
power 
 (yes=1) (years) (percent) (years) (0-100) 
India 0.165 17.6 -17.40 -2.48 34.5 
Bangladesh 0.200 14.3 -26.39 -1.16 28.6 
Nepal 0.071 16.2 -13.26 -3.17 33.7 
Pakistan 0.107 17.9 -16.97 -3.11 35.8 
South Asia  0.154 17.1 -17.98 -2.45 34.0 
 
Empirical Methodology 
The central empirical task of this paper is to investigate whether women’s relative 
decisionmaking power affects the nutritional status of girls and boys differently.  The 
technique used is to test for structural differences in the determinants of child nutritional 
status and their strength of association for girl and boy children, employing multivariate 
regression analysis.  A country fixed-effects regression model is specified (Greene 
1997).6  In addition to the index of women’s relative decisionmaking power, the 
                                                 
6 While a household or “maternal” fixed effects analysis (Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2003) would 
control for factors influencing child nutritional status at the household level other than those directly 
included as explanatory variables here, it is not possible to implement this approach.  This is because even 
though a sufficient number of cases exist where a woman has two or more children of opposite sex under 
three years of age (N = 2,982 children), the explanatory variables employed, and most particularly 
women’s status, do not vary across children in the same household. 
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independent variables, commonly included in studies of the socioeconomic determinants 
of child nutritional status, are 
• the child’s sex, measured as a dummy variable indicating whether the child is a 
boy (0) or girl (1); 
• the child’s age, measured as an ordered dummy variable, with the 0–1 group 
being the reference category and indicator dummies for the 1–2 and 2–3 groups; 
• the woman’s and her husband’s education, measured as ordered dummy variables, 
with “no education” being the reference category and indicator dummies for both 
primary and secondary education; 
• type of water use, with the reference category being surface water and dummy 
variables for well and piped water, reflecting increasingly safe water; 
• type of latrine use, with the reference category being no latrine and dummy 
variables for pit latrines and flush toilets indicating more sanitary facilities; 
• economic status, with households classified into four groups, destitute, poor, 
middle, and rich, based on consideration of two factors: the degree to which a 
household is able to satisfy the basic needs of its members using its own 
investments, as opposed to public resources, and ownership of various assets;7 
                                                 
7 The variables used to reflect whether basic needs are met are a home with a finished floor, a home with a 
toilet facility of some kind, and access to water piped into the home.  The assets are broken into two 
groups, those that are relatively cheap (radio, television, and bicycle) and those that are relatively expensive 
(refrigerator, motorcycle, and car).   The classification is based on numbers of basic needs satisfied and 
cheap or expensive assets owned rather than on any specific type of need or asset in order to maintain 
cross-country comparability.  The four groups and their definitions are as follows: 
Destitute Owns no assets and satisfies either none or only one basic need; 
Poor Owns no assets but satisfies two basic needs, or owns only cheap assets and satisfies 
either none or only one basic need; 
Middle Owns only cheap assets and satisfies either two or three of the basic needs, or owns 
at least one expensive asset but satisfies either none or one basic need; and 
Rich Owns at least one expensive asset and satisfies two or three of the basic needs. 
Here a “destitute” household owns no luxury items at all and has an unfinished floor, no toilet facility, and 
water that is not piped into the home, or has just one of these amenities.  By contrast, a “rich” household 
owns an expensive luxury asset, such as a refrigerator or motorized vehicle, and has satisfied all or almost 
all of the basic needs.  The poor and middle groups fall in between (see Smith et al. 2003 for additional 
information). 
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• the child’s parents’ ages; 
• household age-sex composition; and 
• country of residence.  
All explanatory variables are assumed to be contemporaneously exogenous (in other 
words, the model is a reduced-form model).8   
The dependent variable, child nutritional status (denoted Y), is hypothesized to be 
determined by the child’s sex and K explanatory variables, denoted X and indexed 
k = 1…K, whose effects are possibly dependent on the child’s sex.  The cross-country 
model takes the form: 
2
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where i denotes children and c denotes countries.  The μc are unobservable country-
specific, household-invariant effects and the νic are stochastic.  Unbiased and consistent 
estimates of the βk and γk can be obtained using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
if the error term does not contain components that are correlated with an explanatory 
variable.  The country effects are included to avoid any such bias emanating from 
country-specific factors that may be correlated with included explanatory variables.9 
                                                 
8 While they are of course important determinants of child nutritional status, more “proximal” 
determinants, such as caring practices and mother’s nutritional status, are not included in the regression 
model.  Including them would lead to biased estimation of the regression coefficients of the socioeconomic 
determinants because they are themselves pathways through which the socioeconomic determinants 
influence child nutrition.  To illustrate, if we include mother’s body mass index (BMI) in the regression 
equation, the coefficient on women’s education would no longer represent the full association between 
education and child nutrition because of the presence of another independent variable (BMI) that is 
partially influenced by education.   
9 Because of the two-stage sample design of the DHS surveys, more than one household is sampled for 
each cluster. Thus the possibility that the error term will not be independently and identically distributed 
arises. Unobserved cluster-specific attributes will influence the outcome variables similarly for households 
living in the same cluster, leading to biased estimates of the parameter covariance matrix.  Additionally, a 
Cook-Weisberg test (STATA 2001) indicates strong heteroskedasticity.  Thus a robust covariance matrix is 
used to compute standard errors (and thus t-statistics). 
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In the above equation, the coefficient of each explanatory variable for boys is 
given by βk.  That for girls is given by (βk + γk).  If γk is statistically significant (at least at 
the 10 percent level), a significant difference in effect between girls and boys is detected.  
To determine whether the girl and boy coefficients are individually statistically 
significant, we estimate the following equation using the data only for the girl children 
and then only for the boy children: 
,
1
.
K
ic k k ic c ic
k
Y Xα β μ υ
=
= + + +∑  
The above regression analysis is conducted first for the entire four-country sample 
of children and then for the four countries individually, followed by a set of regressions 
run by age groups of children (0–1 year olds, 1–2 year olds, and 2–3 year olds) within 
countries.  Finally, using data from India only, regressions are run separately for regions 
and states within the country to test for differences at more geographically disaggregated 
levels. 
4.  Empirical Results 
In this section we first lay out the evidence on gender differences in child 
nutritional status and discuss their implications for the existence of gender discrimination.  
We then present the results of the regression analysis examining the relationship between 
women’s power and gender discrimination among children. 
Evidence on Gender Differences in Child Nutritional Status 
Because of biological differences between girls and boys, gender bias—a 
behavioral phenomenon—as manifested in measures of physical well-being, often 
reveals itself not in comparing girls and boys directly, but in comparing differences 
between them to some norm.  Boys are inherently more vulnerable to illness than girls as 
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infants, even in an optimal health environment.  Therefore, the first year of life (infancy) 
is characterized by excess male mortality.  However, empirical evidence shows that in the 
1–4 age group, gender differentials in mortality are normally insignificant.  Thus, 
inferring gender bias in the 0–1 age group from mortality data requires examination of 
whether girl-boy mortality differentials are higher than the norm of a health-neutral 
environment (a differential less than zero), while inferring it in the 1–4 age group 
requires examination of whether the differentials are higher than (roughly) zero 
(Agnihotri 1999). 
Inferring gender bias using anthropometric data requires the same sensitivity to 
(1) the comparison of gender differences with some norm, and (2) differences in norms 
across age groups.  To be sure, the measure employed in this study, the height-for-age Z-
score, already incorporates a comparison to a reference norm that takes into account 
biologically based gender differences in growth.  But in developing countries, even 
without evidence of gender bias, we see infant boys doing worse than girls in nutritional 
status, which is similar to the pattern of mortality data.  Perhaps this is because living 
conditions are harsher than those facing the reference population, which exaggerates the 
gender difference attributable to biological male vulnerability.  Given that boy children as 
a group are worse off than girl children, a bias against females can be detected if girls are 
doing the same or worse than boys nutritionally, especially in the 1–4 age group.  This is 
indeed the pattern revealed by the data from South Asia used in this paper.  
Table 3 first compares the children of South Asia with those of two other 
developing regions, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), both of which have been found to be sites of little gender discrimination among 
children (Arnold 1997).  It shows that among 0–3 year olds as a group, boys have slightly 
lower long-term nutritional status than girls in both SSA and LAC.  In comparison, while 
not statistically significant, the opposite pattern is found for South Asia:  girls have 
slightly lower measures of nutritional status, on average, than boys. 
The gender differences are more starkly revealed when examined by age group.  
The second through fourth columns of Table 3 report girl and boy HAZ means for 0–1 
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year olds (infants), 1–2 year olds, and 2–3 year olds.  Among 0–1 year olds in SSA and 
LAC, we find a fairly strong difference in HAZ in favor of girls (the difference is 0.15 Z-
scores for both); for South Asia, we also find a statistically significant difference in favor 
of girls, but it is much smaller (0.04 Z-scores).  This suggests the presence of gender 
discrimination even among infants.  For 1–2 and 23 year olds in SSA and LAC, we 
continue to see differences in favor of girls.  However, in contrast, South Asia exhibits a 
pattern favoring boys.  In the 2–3 year old group, the average HAZ for girls is less than 
that for boys by 0.14 Z-scores, a statistically significant difference. 
Table 3—Nutritional status of girls and boys in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin 
America and the Caribbean (mean height-for-age Z-score) 
 0-3 year olds 0-1 year olds  1-2 year olds  2-3 year olds 
 Girls Boys Girls Boys  Girls Boys  Girls Boys 
Developing regions           
  South Asia -1.86 -1.81 -1.11 -1.15***  -2.21 -2.19  -2.26 -2.12***
  Sub-Saharan Africa -1.33 -1.44*** -0.60 -0.75***  -1.71 -1.84***  -1.82 -1.88***
  Latin America/Caribbean -0.61 -0.69*** -0.32 -0.47***  -0.90 -0.97***  -0.61 -0.62 
South Asian countries           
  Bangladesh -1.91 -1.93 -1.08 -1.11  -2.32 -2.33  -2.40 -2.34 
  India -1.86 -1.79 -1.13 -1.16**  -2.21 -2.18  -2.23 -2.07***
  Nepal -1.98 -1.93 -1.21 -1.26  -2.25 -2.21  -2.51 -2.34** 
  Pakistan -1.74 -1.81 -0.87 -1.03  -2.13 -2.16  -2.29 -2.31 
Notes:  ** and *** indicate that a two-sided t-test of the girl-boy difference is significant at 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.  Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  Countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean include Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. 
 
This is illustrated graphically in Figure 1, which shows the relationship between 
age (in months) and the girl-boy HAZ difference for South Asia, SSA, and LAC.  In all 
regions, we see a pattern where the girl advantage begins to drop off near the end of the 
first year.  This is consistent with a reduction with age in the importance of the biological 
factors driving gender differences.  What stands out is that in South Asia, the girl-boy 
HAZ difference stays near zero and far below the other regions over most of the 0–3 age 
range and actually drops below zero at 19 months.  Curiously, in LAC, the difference 
drops below zero as well, at 26 months. 
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Figure 1  Girl-boy difference in height-for-age Z-score,
by developing country region and age
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Note:  Generated using lowess smoothing of the average girl-boy difference in height-for-age Z-
score over all sample children in the region-specific data sets (see notes to Table 3 for a list of 
countries). 
 
Returning to Table 3, the lower panel presents the mean HAZ for girls and boys 
from the four study countries.  Among 0–1 year olds, the mean Z-score for boys is 
consistently less than that for girls, though the difference is only statistically significant 
for India.  Among 1–2 year olds, boy and girl Z-scores are roughly equal.  By 2–3 years 
of age, mean Z-scores for girls are lower than for boys in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, 
with the latter two countries displaying the biggest differences (0.16 and 0.17 Z-scores, 
respectively), indicating the presence of anti-girl gender bias in caring practices.  Pakistan 
stands out from the other three countries, displaying a particularly strong girl-boy 
difference in favor of girls among 0–1 year olds (0.16 Z-scores) and no significant 
difference among 1–3 year olds, a pattern more consistent with those of SSA and LAC.  
Note that this result is not consistent with the cultural patterns described in Hazarika 
(2000) and Miller (2001), which characterize Pakistan as similar to North and West India 
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when it comes to women’s status and son preference (see discussion of regional patterns 
within India below). 
The Relationship Between Women’s Power and Gender Discrimination Among 
Children:  Regression Results 
Table 4 presents the results of regressions exploring the determinants of child 
nutritional status for girls and boys using the entire sample of children in the four 
countries combined while controlling for country of residence.  Both boys’ and girls’ 
nutritional statuses are influenced by the major socioeconomic determinants in the  
Table 4—Determinants of child height-for-age Z-scores in South Asia:  Girl-boy differences 
 Girls Boys  
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic  
p-value for 
difference (if 
significant)a 
Women’s relative decisionmaking power 0.018 7.45*** 0.012 5.30***  0.074 
Mother’s education: primary 0.154 4.76*** 0.160 5.11***   
Mother’s education: secondary 0.275 6.22*** 0.358 8.71***   
Father’s education: primary 0.108 3.34*** 0.151 4.72***   
Father’s education: secondary 0.264 7.19*** 0.269 7.95***   
Well water used -0.098 -1.95* 0.037 0.79   
Piped water used -0.049 -0.94 0.071 1.46  0.083 
Pit latrine used 0.169 4.70*** 0.087 2.51**   
Flush toilet used 0.254 5.57*** 0.205 4.85***   
Poor 0.064 2.18** 0.072 2.60***   
Middle 0.192 4.45*** 0.183 4.42***   
Rich 0.383 6.79*** 0.367 6.86***   
Child aged 1-2 -1.080 -37.98*** -1.018 -37.88***   
Child aged 2-3 -1.120 -37.09*** -0.951 -33.90***  0.000 
Mother’s age -0.020 -4.30*** -0.016 -3.67***   
Father’s age 0.019 5.63*** 0.015 5.05***   
Household size -0.011 -3.30*** -0.008 -2.31**   
Percent females 15-55 0.006 3.99*** 0.004 2.56**   
Percent females 55+ 0.003 1.50 0.003 1.62   
Percent males 0-15 0.000 0.47 0.000 -0.01   
Percent males 15-55 0.002 1.70* 0.001 1.00   
Percent males 55+ 0.000 -0.01 -0.001 -0.86   
Bangladesh -0.003 -0.06 -0.030 -0.62   
Nepal 0.067 1.67* 0.117 2.99***   
Pakistan -0.011 -0.21 -0.021 -0.40   
Number of observations  15,967  17,349   
R-squared  0.185  0.159   
Notes:  All p-values are based on White-corrected standard errors and are robust to intra-cluster correlation. 
a For variables constructed using more than one term (ordered dummy variables), the reported statistic is for a test of a 
jointly significant difference. 
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expected, positive direction:  the child’s mother’s decisionmaking power relative to her 
husband’s, the child’s parents’ educations and ages, and the economic status, sanitary 
conditions, and size of the child’s household.  The only exception is safe water use.  The 
use of well and piped water (as opposed to surface water) appears to have a weak 
association with children’s nutritional status.  This brings into doubt the cleanliness of 
water, perhaps due to inadequate protection from human and animal waste or, as appears 
to be the case in Bangladesh, from groundwater toxins such as arsenic.  The regression 
coefficients on the age dummy variables bring out the reduction in nutritional status after 
one year of age typical in developing countries.  Note that the pattern has a fairly strong 
gender difference:  the age-related reduction for the 2–3 year old group is substantially 
greater for girls than boys (1.12 versus 0.95 Z-scores). 
Our main interest is in determining whether there is a gender difference in the 
effect of women’s relative decisionmaking power on child nutritional status.  The test for 
parameter stability does indeed pick up on such a difference.  Although it is not strongly 
statistically significant (p = 0.074), its magnitude is fairly large.  The estimated girl 
coefficient on the index of women’s relative decisionmaking power is 50 percent higher 
than the boy coefficient (0.018 versus 0.012).  To give a sense of the practical 
significance of the regression coefficients and their difference, Figure 2 plots out the 
predicted HAZ for girl and boy children as the index of women’s relative decisionmaking 
power increases over its range.  The increase in HAZ is large for both boys and girls, 
confirming that this variable has a strong influence on child nutritional status in the 
region, as found by Smith et al. (2003).  In terms of the girl-boy difference, an increase in 
the index of women’s decisionmaking power relative to men’s from its current level of 34 
points to 61 points, almost double, would be required to bring about a girl-boy difference 
roughly on par with that of SSA, for instance (which is 0.11 Z-scores).  Thus, for the 
South Asian region as a whole, the regression results imply that an increase in women’s 
relative decisionmaking power—if quite substantial—would be an effective force for 
reducing gender discrimination against girl children. 
21 
Figure 2  Predicted height-for-age Z-scores of girls and boys by 
index of women's relative decisionmaking power
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The top panel of Table 5 reports the regression results for the index of women’s 
relative decisionmaking power for 0–3 year olds by country.  The lower panel gives the 
results broken down by age group.  Bolded coefficients signify that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent or lower level.  For the 0–3 year olds as a group, 
the regression coefficients for Bangladesh and Nepal are not statistically significant.  This 
could indicate that women’s relative decisionmaking power has no impact on child 
nutritional status in these countries, that the variation in this independent variable is not 
strong enough to pick up an impact if one indeed exists,10 or that statistically significant 
impacts among some population groups within these countries (for example, age or 
ethnic groups) are canceling each other out at the aggregate level.  In the case of Nepal, 
any of these could apply, and it is not possible to tell which. 
                                                 
10 An examination of the standard deviations of the index of women’s relative decisionmaking power 
reveals that Bangladesh and Nepal have the lowest within-country variance.  The standard deviations are 
India, 7.2; Bangladesh, 6.4; Nepal, 6.8; and Pakistan, 8.2. 
 Table 5—Girl-boy differences in the effect of women’s relative decisionmaking power on children’s height-for-age Z-scores, by country 
and age group 
 Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan 
Variable Girl Boy 
p-value for 
difference (if 
significant) Girl Boy 
p-value for 
difference (if 
significant) Girl Boy 
p-value for 
difference (if 
significant) Girl Boy 
p-value for 
difference (if 
significant) 
0-3 year olds -0.001 -0.003  0.018 0.016  0.008 0.007  0.025 0.005 0.064 
Number of observations 1,372 1,395  11,574 12,786  1,800 1,892  1,221 1,276  
R-squared 0.262 0.237  0.175 0.147  0.238 0.208  0.249 0.212  
             
             
0-1 year olds -0.015 0.027 0.022 0.006 0.011  0.013 0.004  0.042 0.012 0.094 
1-2 year olds 0.014 -0.030 0.022 0.028 0.018  -0.002 0.014  0.018 0.010  
2-3 year olds 0.007 -0.010  0.019 0.020  0.014 0.008  0.014 0.003  
Notes:  All p-values are based on White-corrected standard errors and are robust to intra-cluster correlation.  Bolded coefficients signify that the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent or lower level. 
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For Bangladesh, after examining the results broken down by age group, it appears 
that the latter reason is applicable.  For 0–1 and 1–2 year olds, we find that there is a 
significant difference (p = 0.022) between the influence of women’s relative 
decisionmaking power for girls and boys.  Specifically, in the 0–1 group, the effect is 
strongly positive for boys but not significant for girls, indicating that improvements in 
women’s power relative to men’s will lead to a worsening of gender discrimination 
against girls among infants.  By contrast, in the 1–2 group, the effect is strongly negative 
for boys, remaining statistically insignificant for girls, suggesting that improvements in 
women’s power will reduce discrimination against girls.  However, the reduction would 
be brought about not through greater improvements in the nutrition of girls, but rather 
through reductions in the nutritional status of boys.  Of course this is not a desirable 
pathway for reducing discrimination against girls in a population group for which the 
average HAZ for both boys and girls is already below the classification of stunting (see 
Table 3). 
The data from India reveal strong positive associations between women’s relative 
decisionmaking power and children’s nutritional status for both boys and girls, but no 
significant difference between them for any of the age groups.  The only country for 
which a significant gender difference in the influence of women’s relative 
decisionmaking power can be detected is Pakistan, where anti-girl discrimination is 
weakest and women’s relative power highest.  Here the effect for girls 0–3 years is very 
strong and that for boys is not statistically significant.  The greater positive influence for 
girls is most apparent in the 0–1 age group. 
Finally, we turn to an examination of the possibility that the influence of women’s 
relative decisionmaking power varies by geographical areas within countries.  Only the 
data from India, for which the large sample size allows such an analysis, are used.  For 
this country, Sen (2001) writes of a “remarkable geographical split” between the states in 
the north and west, where the female-male ratio of children is lower than 0.948 (a 
European benchmark), indicating the presence of strong gender-based discrimination 
(see, also, Miller 1981), and the states in the east and south where it is above.  Sen 
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attributes these differences not to gaps in economic prosperity but instead to differences 
in cultural and social influences.  The left-hand panel of Table 6 reports regression 
coefficients for the index of women’s relative decisionmaking power for the north and 
west region and the right-hand panel for the east and south. 
For the northern and western states as a whole, the boy coefficient is substantially 
higher than the girl coefficient (70 percent), indicating that when women’s power is 
increased, they use it to favor boys, although the girl-boy difference is not statistically 
significant.  For the eastern and southern states by contrast, the girl coefficient is much 
higher than the boy coefficient, and their difference is statistically significant at a 5 
percent level.  Disaggregating geographically even further, separate regressions were run 
for each of the country’s states.  For one of these states, Haryana in the north, the boy 
coefficient was found to be much higher than the girl coefficient (0.057 versus –0.003) 
and their difference to be significant at a 5 percent level, strong evidence that increases in 
women’s relative decisionmaking power will increase discrimination against girl children 
in this location.  For the state of West Bengal in the eastern part of the country, the 
opposite is found.  These results give added emphasis to the importance of avoiding 
generalizations to world regions, countries within them, and even localized areas within 
countries.  As discussed in the next section, intracountry differences in class, kinship 
structure, marriage practices, and property inheritance laws may cancel out any 
significant finding at the national level. 
5.  Discussion of Results 
The general conclusion reached from the empirical analysis of this paper is that 
for the South Asian region as a whole, an increase in women’s relative decisionmaking 
power—if substantial—may indeed be an effective force for reducing gender 
discrimination against girl children.  However, this finding is certainly not applicable 
everywhere and for all children in the region.  Pakistan is the only country of the four 
studied for which there is strong evidence that increases in women’s power benefit girl 
 Table 6—Girl-boy differences in the effect of women’s relative decisionmaking power on children’s height-for-age Z-scores (0-3 year 
olds), Indian regions and states 
 North and west states South and east states 
 All Haryana All West Bengal 
Variable Girl Boy 
p-value for 
difference (if 
significant) Girl Boy 
p-value for 
difference (if 
significant) Girl Boy 
p-value for 
difference (if 
significant) Girl Boy 
p-value for 
difference (if 
significant) 
Coefficients 0.010 0.017  -0.003 0.057 0.021 0.017 0.004 0.041 0.026 -0.008 0.036 
Number of observations 7,069 7,884  387 472  4,200 4,552  481 544  
R-squared 0.1827 0.1546  0.243 0.216  0.155 0.1282  0.211 0.235  
Notes:  All p-values are based on White-corrected standard errors and are robust to intra-cluster correlation.  Bolded coefficients signify that the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent or lower level.  The north and west states included in the regressions are Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and New Delhi.  The south and east states are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka, Kerala, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, 
Nagaland, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Arunachal Pradesh, and Tripura.  This breakdown largely follows that given by Sen (2001). 
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children more than boy children.  While the finding does not apply for Bangladesh at the 
country level, it does for 1–2 year old Bangladeshi children.  In India, we find that it 
applies only for the region comprising the eastern and southern states.  Furthermore, in 
two cases, we find evidence that increases in women’s relative decisionmaking power 
can be expected to worsen discrimination against girl children.  The first is for 0–1 year 
olds in Bangladesh.  The second is for the northern and western states of India, with 
particularly strong evidence for the northern state of Haryana. 
The lack of a consistent positive association between women’s decisionmaking 
power and gender discrimination within South Asia calls for a deeper examination of the 
factors underlying gender discrimination.  The anthropological and economic literature 
on son preference provides useful insights for unpacking the findings by sifting through 
the embedded cultural and economic roots of gender discrimination against females. 
Within the highly patriarchal social systems of South Asia, two institutions, 
patrilocal postmarital residence and patrilineal inheritance, are thought to underlie gender 
discrimination against females (Messer 1997; Miller 1997; Das Gupta et al. 2003).  These 
social institutions typically coincide with kinship systems that attribute social identity to 
male lineage.  Patrilocality dictates that a couple take up residence in the man’s home, 
weakening a woman’s decisionmaking power, particularly if she brings with her few or 
no assets that she can control.  Patrilineal inheritance patterns dictate the transfer of 
productive assets through male lines, marginalizing women’s and girls’ economic and 
social value in both their natal and postmarital households. 
Comparative research highlights regional variation in gender discrimination 
within South Asia associated with the flexibility of patriarchal kinship systems.  Within 
India, for example, compared to the North, the South is characterized by “less rigid 
construction of gender in the kinship system” (Das Gupta et al. 2003).  Women have 
greater access to property through traditional marriage transfers than in the North (Harriss 
1990).  Bride-price, in which the groom’s family is expected to transfer economic 
resources to the bride’s family, is more common in the South, while dowry is more 
common in the North.  Further, in the South, women have greater economic roles and the 
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custom of marital hypergamy (marrying for social mobility) is weak or absent (Basu 
1999).11  Differences in social institutions such as these may explain our inability to 
generalize a positive association between women’s decisionmaking power and 
discrimination against girl children. 
Turning to the economic roots of son preference in South Asia, parents’ 
perceptions of greater economic contributions by male children may explain, in part, why 
in some areas of South Asia, women as mothers and mothers-in-laws are themselves 
agents of gender discrimination within the household.  Old-age support for women is 
highly dependent on resources from their adult sons.  If resources are allocated based on 
perceptions of economic contribution to household welfare over the lifetime, women 
motivated by self-interest in their own future economic security would be expected to 
invest more in sons (Messer 1997; Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka 2004) and perhaps 
to use any increased power to do so. 
In future studies of the determinants of gender discrimination, the influence of 
class and caste group (Miller 1997; Murthi, Guio, and Drèze 1995; Harriss 1990) as well 
as birth order and the gender composition of older siblings should be taken into account.  
These factors may interact with women’s status in influencing gender discrimination.  
With regard to class, Miller (1997) finds that intrahousehold nutritional discrimination 
against girls is stronger among the propertied classes than the poor.  With regard to birth 
order, second- or third-born girls are often at a disadvantage as additional daughters are 
seen as excessive future financial liabilities because of the necessity of marriage 
payments coupled with a perceived lack of economic contribution (Pal 1999; 
Subramanian 1996; Miller 2001). 
                                                 
11 It is interesting to note that in some areas, South Indians are shifting their aspirations to copy the social 
forms of the upper class from the North, where women’s status is lower.  This is evident, for example, in 
the increased practice of dowry (Basu 1999).  This possible convergence of the South to the patterns of 
gender discrimination in the North needs further empirical study. 
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6.  Policy Implications 
The lesson for policymakers and development practitioners is that while 
increasing women’s decisionmaking power is likely to improve the well-being of 
children, in some geographic areas it will not necessarily diminish the anti-girl 
discrimination that violates human rights and undermines the region’s economic 
development and the health of its population.  A key reason that mothers prefer to invest 
in boys more than in girls is a perception that the returns are higher from boy children 
when they become adults.  Overcoming this perception will require increasing the 
economic returns to investments in girls by (1) extending and improving schooling 
systems in rural areas and increasing parental incentives to send girls to school; (2) 
removing barriers to female participation in labor markets and developing technologies 
that increase the returns to women’s labor (Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka 2004; 
Murthi, Guio, and Drèze 1995).  The implementation of formal social security systems 
would also lessen parent reliance on children in old age (Hallman 2003). 
However, as discussed above, at the root of son preference are long-standing, 
deeply embedded cultural and social influences, such as customs regarding marriage and 
inheritance associated with patriarchal kinship systems.  These influences act as 
constraints to reducing discrimination against girls that increases in women’s power in 
the household may not be sufficient to overcome.  Several authors have addressed the 
rigidity of son preference despite increased education and economic opportunities for 
women, arguing that women remain marginal if social roles within the family do not 
change (Das Gupta 2003; Pal 1999).  And writes Sen (2001, 15) “When anti-female bias 
... reflects the hold of traditional masculinist values from which mothers themselves may 
not be immune, what is needed is not just freedom of action, but also freedom of thought 
—in women’s ability and willingness to question received values.”  Such a fundamental 
change in perceptions will require policy measures that address the patriarchal customs 
practiced within the household and society on which both women’s and men’s values are 
based.  Legislative reform to equalize civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
29 
rights, including rights to asset inheritance and ownership and voting rights, is 
fundamental in this endeavor.  Also important are continued efforts to eliminate the 
practice of dowry.  Measures to protect women’s mobility and their physical and 
emotional safety would increase their access to new information and enable them to 
formulate and express nontraditional values without fear of retribution. 
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